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ARTICLES
The Legality of the U.S. Economic Blockade of
Cuba Under International Law
by Paul A. Shneyer* and Virginia Barta**
I. INTRODUCTION
O N JANUARY 1, 1959, the rebel army, led by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruiz,
marched into Havana as Fulg~nico Batista quickly escaped from the
Caribbean Island of Cuba. By 1961, the Cuban government, under the
leadership of Castro, had declared itself the first Socialist country in the
Western Hemisphere and the U.S. Congress had authorized the President
to terminate the sugar subsidy which Cuba had been receiving since
1948.1 Subsequently, diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cuba
and the United States were broken.2 Through a combination of statutory
.authorizations and executive orders the United States launched what has
been variously labeled by a boycott, embargo and blockade of Cuba which
has lasted for almost 20 years. This paper analyzes the legal framework
under which the U.S. government has authorized, organized, and imple-
mented the cessation of trade with Cuba and the legality of such action
under international law.
Little has been written about the legal relationship between these
two neighbors since the 1962 missile crisis and the U.S. quarantine of
*J.D., Rutgers Law School in Newark, New Jersey (1979). Admitted to the bars of the
States of New Jersey and New York. Currently employed as an associate counsel to a union
of professional employees.
** J.D., Rutgers Law School in Newark, New Jersey (1979). Admitted to the bars of the
States of New Jersey and New York. Currently with the State of New Jersey, Office of the
Public Defender, Appellate Section.
t The authors wish to express their thanks and appreciation to Professor Arthur Kinoy
of Rutgers Law School for his assistance and guidance in the preparation of this article and
to the law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky and Lieberman of New York for
the access to their invaluable source material.
Act to amend the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, Pub. L. No. 86-592, 74 Stat. 330
(1960) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq. (1970) (expired Dec. 31, 1974)).
2 Diplomatic ties with Cuba were severed on January 3, 1961. See, 44 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 103-04 (1961).
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Cuba.3 By focusing on one specific question, the legality of the U.S. eco-
nomic boycott of Cuba under international law, hopefully this paper will
contribute to a beginning of the analysis of the legal relationships be-
tween the two States.
The restrictions of trade with Cuba by the United States has been
commonly labeled a "blockade" and is referred to as such in the media.
Under international law the term "blockade" has a specialized meaning
which signifies a belligerent measure taken by a nation at war to prevent
an enemy from receiving aid.4 Usually a blockade involves a physical in-
terference and a blocking of ships or other transport from reaching the
target state.' If taken by a nation not at war, a blockade has been consid-
ered an act of war.' Though the U.S. quarantine of Cuba in 1962 has been
called both a "blockade" and a "pacific blockade,' '7 the current restriction
on trade between the United States and Cuba is not the belligerent act of
war which is traditionally the connotation given the term, blockade.
A boycott under international law is considered a modern form of
reprisal whereby a State interrupts and/or terminates its commercial and
financial relationships with another.' Historically, the word "embargo"
referred to a forcible detention of vessels of the target State which were
docked at the port of the State enacting the embargo.' Currently, "em-
bargo" is more correctly used to mean prohibitions on exports between
one country and another.'"
The U.S. action against Cuba, while denominated "embargo" in offi-
cial U.S. publications, can more properly be called an economic blockade:
something more than an embargo in that it is extended to imports and
more than a boycott, in that the United States attempted to control ac-
tions of third party states." For this reason, the term "economic block-
3 On October 23, 1962 President Kennedy authorized the Secretary of Defense to "in-
terdict . . . the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materi6l to Cuba." Pres. Proc.
No. 3504, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,401 (1962). One month later he terminated that authority. Pres.
Proc. No. 3507, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,525 (1962). For a range of views on the quarantine see
Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515 (1963); Christol, Mari-
time Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Materitl to
Cuba, 1962, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 525 (1963); Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L
L. 546 (1963). See also, Legal Impediments to Normalization of Trade with Cuba, 8 LAW
AND POLICY IN INT'L BUSINESS 1007 (1976).
' 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 861 (1968).
5Id.
Id. at 869; N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1981, at A-22, col. 1.
7 See, Meeker, supra note 3, at 515.
J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 291 (1954 ed.).
9Id.
See, id.
DuBois, L'Embargo dans la Pratique Contemporaine, [1967] ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 99 (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique). The term economic
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ade" will be employed here.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The present economic blockade of trade with Cuba was imposed by
Presidential Proclamation No. 3447 of February 6, 196212 and Cuban As-
sets Control Regulations of July 8, 1963.2 Proclamation 3447 prohibits all
trade with Cuba, and gives authority to the Secretaries of the Treasury
and Commerce to make exceptions consistent with the general policy of
the Proclamation."' The Cuban Assets Control Regulations prohibit all
currency transactions between the United States and Cuba unless li-
censed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 5
The statutory authority for both regulations is Section 620 (a) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961" which provides, in part, ". . . the Presi-
dent is authorized to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all
trade between the United States and Cuba."' 7 In addition, authority for
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, and perhaps for the economic
blockade as well, can be found in Section 5 (b) of the Trading With The
Enemy Act of 1917,'" which gives the President very broad authority to
regulate currency "during the time of war or any other period of national
emergency declared by the President."'" Such a period of national emer-
gency was declared by President Truman in 1950.20 The Control Regula-
tions and the declaration of emergency, were based on that statute as well
as on Proclamation 3447.
It will be noted that Congress merely authorized the President to
impose the trade sanctions and the currency regulations; it did not direct
him to take any action. There is no doubt that the President has the
embargo has begun to receive wider recognition and acceptance in the media recently. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1981, at 16, col. 1.
12 3 C.F.R. 157 (1959-1963 comp.).
" 31 C.F.R. § 515 et seq. (1980).
", See, 3 C.F.R. at 158 (1959-1963 comp.).
" 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1980). The State Department recently expelled a Cuban diplo-
mat for attempting to lure Ameican business to Cuba in violation of the Control Regula-
tions. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1981, at A9, col. 1. The Treasury Department has detained Cu-
ban publications which were mailed to residents of the U.S. who did not have licenses. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1981, at 16, col. 1.
"e 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (Supp. III 1979).
17 Id.
IS 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
1" The quoted language has been amended to read, "[d]uring the time of war", thus
contracting the very broad grant of power to regulate the currency. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)
(Supp. III 1979).
0 In December, 1950 President Truman issued Proclamation 2914 declaring a national
emergency due to the situation in Korea. 3 C.F.R. 99 (1949-1953 comp.), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. app., at 1935 (1976).
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power to revoke both the trade sanctions of 1962 and the Control Regula-
tions of 1963 by appropriate administrative directives. Until he does so,
however, the restrictions remain in effect, with whatever exceptions may
be authorized by the State, Commerce or Treasury Departments, unless
Congress takes action. Bills to eliminate all restrictions on trade have
been introduced into the House of Representatives each year since 1975
but have not passed.
2 1
Between 1933 and 1971, the President of the United States had, on
several occasions, declared that a national emergency existed, thus giving
him the right to exercise certain emergency powers.2 Many of these dec-
larations of emergency had never been terminated."2 In 1976, Congress
passed the National Emergencies Act24 terminating, as of September
1978, proclamations of national emergency which were in effect in Sep-
tember, 1976. 21 However, an exception was made with respect to action
taken by the President under Section 5 (b) of the Trading With The En-
emy Act of 1917.26 Thus the Trade and currency regulations relating to
Cuba are still legally in effect.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRIOR TRADE SANCTIONS
Concepts of international law date back to the origins of relations
between States involved in the exchange of goods and trading as early as
the Middle Ages. As with other cultural, political and economic inheri-
tances which shape today's world, the legal ideas of 500 years ago have
developed and evolved, albeit more slowly, as the objective economic real-
ities of society have changed. The concepts which molded and formed
international law in the 20th century prior to World War II, have their
roots in the 19th century industrial revolution in Europe and the concur-
" See, e.g., H.R. 927, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H 129 (dailey ed. Jan. 19,
1981).
s' E.g., 3 C.F.R. 99 (1949-1953 comp.), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app., at 1935 (1976); see,
S. REP. No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4540, 4541.
21 S. REP. No. 94-1168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 2288, 2295.
2' 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
" 50 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976).
20 See, 50 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(1) (1976). In December, 1977 Congress repealed the section
5(b) exception, 50 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979), in an effort to further "delimit the
President's authority to regulate international economic transactions during wars or na-
tional emergencies". S. REP. No. 95-466, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4540, 4541. However, the amending legislation, the War or Na-
tional Emergency-Presidential Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625
(1977), provides that after September, 1978 the President may continue to exercise author-
ity under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act for unlimited one year periods
upon a determination that such action is in the national interest. Id.
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rent expansion of trade on a worldwide level. The States involved in de-
veloping international law were limited to the Western nations in exis-
tence at that time. The law was created for a world in which three
continents were controlled by the major colonial powers.2
The composition of the community of States since World War II has
changed drastically with the destruction of colonial empires. The United
Nations, at the time of its formation, had approximately 50 member
States28 and by December 1978 it had over 151 members.2 9 The underde-
veloped nations of the world now represent a majority of the States in the
United Nations. They have forced a rethinking and a reconsideration of
many questions of international relations, including standards of inter-
national conduct and international law.
Within this context of developing and changing norms of interna-
tional law it is impossible to pinpoint one presently accepted standard of
conduct regarding international trade and principles of sovereignty.
There is disagreement amongst nations and scholars. The sources referred
to in establishing the law include: the express consent of States, as evi-
denced by treaties and international agreements; tacit consent, reflecting
a State's conduct and submission to certain rules of international law;
and the writings of legal scholars in the area of international law. 0
The discussion below examines the U.S. blockade of trade with Cuba
under two distinct theories of international law. The first, herein termed
the traditional view, has its roots in the international law of the 19th cen-
tury regarding reprisals; it is the standard which spokespersons for the
U.S. government appear to accept."1 The latter is based on the consensus
expressed by the majority of States in the last 25 years through the U.N.
charter, U.N. resolutions and other international treaties and documents,
and has been labeled for purposes of clarification and discussion the con-
temporary view.2
Under whichever theory is accepted by the reader, the conclusion as
to the legality of the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba is the same: the
United States has breached the acceptable standard of conduct between
States and is engaging in an illegal economic blockade of the Republic of
Cuba.
The 20th century has seen numerous examples of nonwarring nations
using or imposing a boycott or an embargo against another State.3 After
17 J. STONE, supra note 8, at 3-25.
2 See [1946-1947] U.N.Y.B. 865-66.
29 DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS, EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 7 (9th
ed. 1979).
*0 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (8th ed. 1955).
" See 10 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4 at 861-68.
" See section V of text infra for a discussion of the "contemporary view".
33 Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187, 188-91 (1974).
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granting the right to import to foreign nations, China attempted to limit
foreign economic domination between the years 1905 and 1933 by encour-
aging eleven boycotts of foreign goods by its citizens: one against the
United States (1905), one against Great Britain (1925-26) and the other
nine against Japan.84
In 1951, the British government and seven major international oil
companies imposed a boycott on the purchase of Iranian oil after the gov-
ernment of Iran, led by Mossadegh, had nationalized the oil industry.
The boycott effectively limited the number of tankers which loaded oil in
Iran and contributed to the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1954. 8' The Soviet
Union and other Eastern European Nations ceased all trade with Yugo-
slavia between 1948 and 1955 and subsequently refused to trade with Al-
bania in 1961.36 In 1951, the Council of the Arab League began an em-
bargo and boycott against Israel which is still in effect.8 7
Economic sanctions have at times been instituted and adopted by
international bodies. The first involved a decision of the League of Na-
tions to impose selective restraints on trade with Italy after the Italian
invasion of Ethiopia.ss The United Nations has invoked sanctions of em-
bargo against South Africa in 1964,39 1970,40 and 1971,41 and against Rho-
desia in 196642 and 1968.4' The Organization of American States (OAS)
initiated an embargo of the Dominican Republic in 1960 which eventually
extended to arms, petroleum, petroleum products, trucks and spare
parts." Economic sanctions are not unique in contemporary international
relations. However, States have attempted to establish and agree on
proper norms of conduct in any resort to economic weapons in order to
reduce international disputes.
3, Bouve, The National Boycott as an International Delinquency, 28 AM. J. INT'L L.
19, 22 (1934).
15 B. NIRUMAND, IRAN, THE NEW IMPERIALISM IN ACTION 69-70 (1969).
36 M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 33-34 (1971).
17 Id. at 28-29.
38 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS 383 (3d ed. 1964).
39 S.C. Res. 191, 1964 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, at 13, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/19 (1964).
40 S.C. Res. 282, 1970 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Countil, at 12, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).
4' G.A. Res. 2671, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 31, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
42 S.C. Res. 221, 1966 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, at 5, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. 1 (1966); S.C. Res. 232, 1966 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. 1 (1966).
," S.C. Res. 253, 1968 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, at 5, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968).
" M. DOXEY, supra note 36, at 37.
Vol. 13:451
BLOCKADE OF CUBA
IV. PERSPECTIVE UNDER TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
As a starting point for the analysis of the use of economic weapons
under the traditional view it is useful to comprehend the general freedom
that States have exercised in regulating trade with foreign nations. Pro-
fessor Eagelton explained a State's power over its foreign trade as follows:
A State is free to set up almost any barrier to trade and intercourse
against one or all states. She may prohibit trade entirely, or in certain
articles, or with certain states: She may establish high tariffs against
some or all states so far as customary international law is concerned
(though there are many treaty limitations).""
The traditional standard of international law concerning economic
coercion has been adopted by the United States in the official Depart-
ment of State publication, Digest of International Law, which discusses
boycotts and embargoes under the section labeled "Reprisals".' Citing
Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law, the Department of State's
position can best be stated through a direct quote:
Reprisals are such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of
one State against another as are exceptionally permitted for compelling
the latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created
by its own international deliquency . . . [Rieprisals are acts, otherwise
illegal, performed by a State for the purpose of obtaining justice for an
international deliquency by taking the law into its own hands."
Two limits are placed on a State's response to another's international de-
liquency: (1) the response must be in proportion to the wrong done and of
the compulsion necessary to insure reparations and (2) the reprisal must
follow after negotiations have proven fruitless. 8 Boycotts and embargoes
are considered modern forms of reprisals and as such should be evalu-
ated, from a traditional point of view, under the standards articulated for
reprisals. 9 Thus, the United States government, in accordance with the
traditional view, has maintained that the blockade of trade with Cuba is
in conformity with international law because it was enacted in response
to the illegal Cuban expropriation and nationalization of American owned
properties in Cuba.5 0
The following discussion first examines whether Cuba had engaged in
any illegal conduct which would justify a U.S. reprisal and then examines
" Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 205, 213
(1974) quoting C. EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 86-87 (3d ed. 1957).
46 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4, at 321-29.
47 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4, at 321.
,8 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4, at 322.
4"See J. STONE, supra note 8, at 289-91.
00 See, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 404 (1960); id. at 715, 716.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
whether the United States complied with acceptable conduct under the
traditional view in imposing the sanctions of reprisal.
A. Legality of Expropriation
The international law of expropriation and nationalization is subject
to the same metamorphosis between traditional and contemporary stan-
dards which the law of reprisals and economic coercion is undergoing
again reflecting the present composition of the world community in the
latter part of the 20th century.
The traditional standard of international law recognizes the right of a
s:)vereign state to expropriate property for public purposes conditioned
on the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.5 The
requirement of compensation is the subject of much debate . . . as the
U.S. Supreme Court noted in Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino,2 one of sev-
eral cases before the U.S. federal courts which involved the proceeds from
the sale of certain sugar by a company nationalized by the Cuban govern-
ment in 1960.
There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a State's power to expropri-
ate the property of aliens. There is, of course, authority ... for the view
that a taking is improper under international law if it is not for a public
purpose, is discriminatory or is without provision for prompt, adequate
and effective compensation. However, Communist countries . . . com-
monly recognize no obligation on the part of the taking country. Certain
representatives of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries
have questioned whether rules of state responsibility toward aliens can
bind nations which have not consented to them and it is argued that the
traditionally articulated standards governing expropriation of property
reflect 'imperialist' interests and are inappropriate to the circumstances
of emergent states.6 3
The Cuban expropriation in the text that follows is analyzed from
both a traditional and contemporary point of view: the former requiring
non-discriminatory nationalization for a public purpose and the payment
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and the latter excluding
reference to public purpose, or any aspect of compensation.
In accordance with the traditional view of international law the
United States claimed that the Cuban expropriations were violative of
said standards because the nationalizations were retaliatory, discrimina-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
185-90 (1965).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
I3 d. at 428-30 (footnotes omitted).
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tory and lacking in adequate compensation.5 The official government
analysis of the Cuban expropriations does not comport with historical
events.
The events in Cuba since 1959 reflect the revolutionary transforma-
tion of a society from a capitalist to a socialist economy.5 5 Though some
readers might not be pleased by these events, in order to evaluate objec-
tively the conduct of both States under international law it is important
to recognize and set into a proper historical perspective the Cuban
expropriations.
On May 17, 1959, the Cuban government enacted the Agrarian Re-
form Act" which authorized the nationalization of all large landholdings
in Cuba, whether owned by Cuban nationals or aliens.5 7 The Agrarian Re-
form Act provided for compensation by redeemable bonds issued for 20
years with an annual interest not to exceed 4.5 percent.58
The U.S. government sent a note of protest on June 11, 1959, com-
plaining that most of the property was owned by U.S. citizens and was
thus subject to exproriation." In response, Cuba indicated that it could
afford only deferred payment terms."
The first properties owned by U.S. citizens were expropriated in Oc-
tober and November, 1959.'1 As reported in the New York Times the ex-
propriations then proceeded as follows: property owned by Batista sup-
porters, December 22, 1959;" Cuban owned match factories, January 4,
1960;s- Cuban television and radio stations, February 22 and March 26,
1960;6" Cuban molasses industry, February 16, 1960;s5 Cuban Telegraph
Company, March 1, 1960;" hotels owned by Cubans and U.S. citizens,
June 11, 1960;67 fertilizer plants owned by U.S. citizens, July 16, 1960;"
See, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715 (1960).
See generally Seers, The Economic and Social Background, in CUBA: THE ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION 3 (D. Seers ed. 1964); L. HUBERMAN & P. SWEEZEY, CUBA: ANATOMY
OF A REVOLUTION (1960).
56 N.Y. Times, May 18, 1959, at 8, col. 3; id., May 19, 1959 at 1, col. 6.
57 N.Y. Times, May 18, 1959, at 8, col. 3; id., May 19, 1959, at 1, col. 6.
58 N.Y. Times, May 18, 1959, at 8, col. 3; id., May 19, 1959, at 1, col. 6.
11 40 DEP'T STATE BULL. 958-59 (1959).
60 See, 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 937-39 (1959).
61 See generally, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., EXPROPRIA-
TION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
16-18 (Comm. Print 1963), reprinted in 2 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1066, 1085-87 (1963).
62 N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1959, at 1, col. 8.
63 N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1960, at 10, col. 4.
64 N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1960, at 3, col. 1; id., Mar. 27, 1960, at 30, col. 1.
11 N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1960, at 1, col. 4.
66 N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1960, at 12, col. 4.
67 N.Y. Times, June 12, 1960, at 1, col. 7.
68 N.Y. Times, July 17, 1960, at 19, col. 1.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Cuban Electric and Telephone Companies, August 1, 1960;" Taiwan
owned bank, September 5, 1960;70 U.S. banks, September 16, 1960;1
Cuban tobacco industry, September 16, 1960;71 Cuban owned banks,
sugar mills, distilleries, chemical companies, textile factories, rice mills,
department stores, construction industries, shipping companies, etc., Oc-
tober 13, 1960;1s rental housing, October 19, 1960;74 and Canadian banks,
December 8, 1960.7 5
Today, substantially all of the means of production, transportation,
distribution an communications have been nationalized." Without dis-
cussing the ideological strengths and weaknesses of a socialist economy,
the nationalizations completed in the early 1960's resulting in the present
economic system in Cuba wherein 95 percent of the economy is controlled
by the central government, reflect a public purpose; a taking which inured
to no individual's benefit.
The requirement of public purpose or utility can be traced back to
Article 1 of the Protocol to the 1950 Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Paris, March 20,
1952. International tribunals have rarely discussed what constitutes
"public purpose" and in no case has property been ordered restored to its
former owner because the taking was determined not to be for public pur-
pose.7 8 Commentators have suggested that the continued requirement of
the concept of public purpose is attributable to its wide recognition,
though the phrase is generally thought to be vague and without any oper-
ative legal content.7 ' The Cuban nationalization of private property, as
part of its economic transformation from capitalist production relations
to socialist relations, must be considered nondiscriminatory and within
the "public purpose" criteria. The long list and effective dates of the ex-
69 N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1960, at 1, col. 6.
70 N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1960, at 18, col. 4.
7' N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1960, at 11, col. 1; id., Sept. 18, 1960, at 39, col. 8. Resolution
No. 2, Def. Ex. 22 Gaceta Oficial (Sept. 17, 1960), reprinted in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1009-10 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
72 N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1960, at 11, col. 1.
71 N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1960, at 1, col. 8.
7' N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1960, at 9, col. 6.
75 N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1960, at 1, col. 2.
7 Nolff, The New Industrial Organization, in CUBA: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
REVOLUTION 296 (D. Seers ed. 1964); M. ZEITLIN & R. SCHEER, CUBA, TRAGEDY IN OUR HEMI-
SPHERE (1963).
77 213 U.N.T.S. 262, amending 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
70 See Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests
of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 555-56 (1961).
71 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
185 (1965).
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propriation of different industries leave no doubt that the Cuban nation-
alizations were implemented without regard to an owner's citizenship.
Properties owned by Cubans, Taiwanese, British, Canadian and U.S.
citizens were all expropriated.
Two cases before the federal courts, however, have held that the ex-
propriations by Cuba of properties owned by U.S. citizens to be violative
of international law.80 Both cases have a long and complicated history in
the Courts, having each been before the Supreme Court on two separate
occasions. The findings of violations of international law, however, were
never reviewed by our highest court.81
In Sabbatino the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the
nationalization of the Compania; Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de
Cuba (C.A.V.), a sugar manufacturer located in Cuba and owned by
United States citizens, to have been retaliatory and discriminatory
against U.S. nationals, and without adequate compensation. 2 The deter-
mination of a retaliatory purpose was based on the language of the pre-
amble to Cuban Law No. 85183 which authorized the nationalization of
properties owned by U.S. citizens. 84 The preamble recited the amendment
to the Sugar Act of 1948 which gave the President of the United States
power to lower the quota of Cuban sugar in the domestic market and gave
the President and Prime Minister of Cuba authority to nationalize prop-
erty of U.S. nationals whenever it shall be advisable or desirable for the
protection of the national interests.80 Though the historical evidence
shows unequivocally that the nationalization of private properties in
Cuba served to transform its economy to a socialist economy, rather than
as individual retaliation against Americans," the Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed its holding that the nationalization of C.A.V. violated interna-
tional law when Sabbatino returned to the court in 1967, sub nom. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr.8 7
In addition, the fact that Cuban owned sugar enterprises were not
expropriated until October 13, 1960, approximately two months after the
"8 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962); Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 478 F.2d
191 (2d Cir. 1973).
0' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 400 U.S. 1019 (1971), 406 U.S. 759 (1972). For a
recent update of the status of the cases arising out of the Cuban nationalizations, see, N.Y.
Law Journal, Aug. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
82 307 F.2d at 868.
83 Law No. 851, Gaceta Oficial (July 7, 1960), Preamble reprinted in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 865 n.14.
84 307 F.2d at 865.
85 Id.
8 See generally Seers, supra note 55.
87 383 F.2d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 1967).
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August 6, 1960 nationalization of C.A.V.,88 strongly influenced the court's
decision. The peculiar facts of Sabbatino, which involved a shipment of
sugar on August 9, 1960, during the interim period between the first na-
tionalizations of the sugar industry and its completion in October, 1960,
enabled the Court to find that "at least with respect to the shipment of
sugar . . . in question, the Cuban government discriminated against
United States nationals."8 9
Finally, the Court found the Cuban offer of compensation to be illu-
sory.90 In recognition of the dispute within the international community
concerning the requirements of compensation, however, the Court de-
clined to decide if compensation was an element of the international law
of taking, and did not rest its holding on the finding of inadequate
compensation."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York 92
involved an action for the excess of money realized on the sale of collat-
eral for a loan and for money on deposit, and various counterclaims and
set-offs based on the confiscation of First National City's Cuban
branches.93 The District Court found the nationalization of the banks to
be a breach of international law due to the lack of adequate compensation
and the retaliatory and discriminatory nature of the expropriations.9 4
Judge Bryan went further than any previous court in discussing the
requirement of compensation from the perspective of the United States
government's view of international law. Based on the legislative history of
the Hickenlooper amendment,9 prohibiting federal courts from not adju-
dicating the merits of a claim of title arising out of a nationalization of
property and based on the Act of State doctrine wherein a violation of
international law is alleged,9" the court found that compensation is re-
quired under the "United States parochial point of view on international
law". " Judge Bryan found the manifest purpose of the decrees to be "po-
litical retaliation of the rankest sort" despite the objective reality of an
economic system undergoing a revolutionary transformation, relying on
the language of the preamble to Cuban Law No. 851. 9'
The discrimination, which the Court found to be a violation of inter-
88 307 F.2d at 867.
8I Id.
o Id. at 862; see notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
9' 307 F.2d at 864.
82 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Id. at 1005.
14 Id. at 1007-11.
" 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
98 Id.
87 270 F. Supp. at 1008.
98 Id. at 1010.
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national law, was (1) the failure of the Cuban government to seize Cuban
banking properties until almost a month after the expropriation of First
National City's branches, resulting in the loss of profit to First National
City due to its inability to conduct its business for 30 days, and (2) a
distinctive compensation scheme for properties owned by United States
nationals, based on trade between Cuba and the United States, which was
not the formula used for compensation of Cuban bank owners.99 The
Court's judgment regarding international law was upheld by the Court of
Appeals'00 after six years of extensive litigation, and was never reviewed
by the Supreme Court.'01
Despite the Supreme Court's appraisal of the international law of
taking, neither decision was able to rest on what constitutes the "illusory
offer of compensation". 02 Instead, the opinions of both the Court of
Appeals and the District Court focus on the preamble of Cuban Law No.
851 to establish a retaliatory motive and, in addition, to find discrimina-
tory treatment in the failure of the Cuban government to expropriate all
similarly situated enterprises on the same day in order to support the
determination of a violation of international law. 03 The analytical focus
of the courts reflects a myopia caused by the ideological rejection of the
Cuban socialist economic organization.
The claim of a retaliatory motive in the nationalization of C.A.V. and
First National City Bank is belittled by the fact that extensive properties
were nationalized both before and after the promulgation of Cuban Law
No. 851 in July of 1960.104 The expropriations were not limited to proper-
ties owned by U.S. nationals but included Cubans, Canadians and
Taiwanese as well. The Cuban policy was motivated by the desire to reor-
ganize the economy. In fact, Cuba succeeded in changing its economic
system, 05 irrespective of whether one finds such transformation to be a
positive or a negative achievement.
The finding of discriminatory treatment premised on a two-month
delay in completion of the nationalization program creates a rule of law
which would wreak havoc if our courts demanded that domestic govern-
"Id.
'" 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
101 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 400 U.S. 1019 (vacat-
ing and remanding without consideration of the merits); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First
Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 406 U.S. 759 (reversing on other grounds). For recent develop-
ments in the Cuban nationalization litigation, see, N.Y. Law Journal, Aug. 10, 1981, at 1,
col. 2.
102 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 862.
"03 Id. at 866-68; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 270 F. Supp.
at 1008-10.
', See notes 61-67 supra and accompanying text.
105 See generally Seers, supra note 55.
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mental bodies initiate programs and effectuate policies simultaneously for
all sectors of the society. Grandparent clauses and effective dates for leg-
islation would fall under the Sabbatino and First National City findings
of discrimination.
The rational relation test is the normal standard of judicial review of
governmental action when discrimination is alleged.10 6 In applying the
"United States parochial view of international law" it is odd that the fed-
eral courts would not extend the same amount of sovereign discretion as
is allowed in review of municipal governmental action.
Under the traditional view of international law, the Cuban expropria-
tions would not be considered illegal. There is equally no merit to the
claim of inadequate compensation. The Cuban compensation formula,
contained in Law No. 851 of July 6, 1960, provided for payment for the
expropriated property in 30-year bonds bearing interest at the rate of at
least two percent. 10 7 The interest was to be paid out of a fund consisting
of 25 percent of the foreign exchange received by Cuba each year from
the sale of sugar to the United States in excess of three million tons at a
price not less than 5.75 cents per pound.' 08 In 1961, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Sabbatino found this offer to be
illusory, based on the fact that U.S. purchases of sugar between 1950 and
1959 rarely exceeded three million tons and never accounted for more
than 5.5 cents per pound. "'
With the benefit of hindsight, the Cuban offer of compensation con-
tained in Cuban Law No. 851 would not have proved illusory. The United
States imported 3.24 million metric tons of sugar from Cuba in 1958.110
Had the United States continued to purchase a proportionate share of its
imported sugar during the last 20 years from Cuba the amount of sugar
purchased would have exceeded the three million ton minimum in half of
the intervening years."'
Prior to 1959 the world price of sugar had approached the 5.75 cents
per pound figure contained in Cuban Law No. 851 only in 1950, 1951, and
1957."' Subsequently, the annual average price of sugar exceeded the
minimum contained in the formula for compensation in 1963, and in 1972
through 1976."1 Based on the pre-1959 U.S. imports of sugar from Cuba
106 E.g., Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-99 (1978).
,o7 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 862.
108 Id.
'' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd,
307 F.2d 845, 862.
11 See Appendix A.
See Appendix B.
See Appendix C.
113 Id.
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the compensation fund would have contained approximately 19 billion
dollars by the end of 1976, enabling the Cubans to compensate ade-
quately the former owners of the expropriated properties.1 1
Moreover, even without the increase in sugar prices there is prece-
dent to support the adequacy of the Cuban compensation offer. The Cu-
ban expropriations were not the first to face the world community and to
be subject to judicial scrutiny. The compensation offered by the Cuban
government was no more illusory than the offer of compensation made by
the Iranian government for its 1951 expropriation of foreign oil proper-
ties, 5 which was considered sufficient by the court of Tokyo, Japan l1 '
and the Civil Court of Rome.1 1 7 The Indonesian nationalization decrees of
Dutch-owned properties in 1958, which provided for no effective means of
compensation, were held by the Bremen Court of Germany to be proper
and justified under international law.11'
B. Traditional Limitations on Reprisals
Assume arguendo, the the finding of the federal courts that the Cu-
ban expropriations were in violation of international law is correct. Under
the traditional view there are two limitations on a State's right to retribu-
tion in response to a target State's delinquent acts which need be ex-
amined before determining the propriety of the United States economic
blockade: (1) the reprisal must be in proportion to the wrong done and of
the compulsion necessary to insure reparations, and (2) negotiations must
prove fruitless. 1 9
The dollar amount placed on property owned by U.S. citizens and
nationalized by the- Cuban government has been set at just under two
billion dollars. 120 The pre-1959 Cuban economy was dependent on trade
114 U.S. citizens claimed reparations of $3,346,406,271.36. [1972] FOREIGN CLAIMS SET-
TLEMENT COMMISSION, ANN. REP. 412.
"' Article 2 of the Iranian confiscation law provided: "the Government can, by mutual
agreement, deposit in the Bank Milli Iran or in any other bank up to 25 per cent of current
revenue from the oil after deduction of exploitation expenses in order to meet the probable
claims of the Company". See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), 1953
W.L.R. 246, 252 (Sup. Ct. Aden 1953) (quoting article 2).
136 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 I.L.R. 305 (D.C. To-
kyo 1953), aff'd, 20 I.L.R. 312 (Higher Ct. Tokyo 1953).
17 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22 I.L.R. 23 (Civ. Ct. Rome 1955).
118 N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschappijen & N.V. Senembah Maatschappij v. Deutsch-
Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft, 28 I.L.R. 16 (D.C. Bremen, W. Ger. 1959), appeal
dismissed, 28 I.L.R. 24 (Ct. App. Bremen, W. Ger. 1959). For a discussion of this case, see
Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L.
305 (1960).
"I See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
120 [1972] FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, ANN. REP. 69. The exact amount is
$1,799,548.69. Id. at 412.
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with the United States.12 ' In addition, the major segments of Cuban in-
dustry were under North American control.12 Between 1950 and 1959,
over 70 percent of Cuba's imports and an average of 65 percent of Cuba's
exports were from or to the United States.2 8 Approximately 60 percent of
Cuba's sugar crop, the major Cuban export in pre-revolutionary Cuba,
was shipped to the United States. 2 " Of the total sugar imported into the
United States between 1950 and 1959, 70 percent was grown in Cuba,
accounting for approximately 40 percent of the sugar consumed in the
United States."2 5
The U.S. economy, being highly industrialized, was obviously not de-
pendent on Cuban trade. Trade with Cuba accounted for only three to
four percent of the goods imported and exported by the United States."2 6
The United States has cut off the market which accounted for about
65 percent of Cuban foreign trade because of Cuba's alleged illegal na-
tionalization of property owned by U.S. nationals in Cuba, and claimed to
be worth two billion dollars. The annual trade cost to Cuba over 20 years
amounts to close to 20 billion dollars based on the pre-1959 trading
figures. 2 7 This disruptive effect on the Cuban economy in no way con-
tributed to reparations to the expropriated owners.
The effect of the blockade on Cuba was not limited to the loss of its
major market. The Cuban economy, due to its dependence on the United
States, had grown attached to and was built upon U.S. technology. 28 The
subsequent inability of Cuba to replace spare parts for its industrial ma-
chinery has seriously impeded production and economic development
since 1959.29
Evaluated in the context of the pre-1959 economic relationship be-
tween Cuba and the United States, the magnitude of the reprisal taken
by the United States against Cuba is out of proportion to the interna-
tional wrongs which the Farr and First National City decisions discussed.
A judicial forum would be hard pressed to find the two month "discrimi-
natory" delay in nationalizing the Cuban owned sugar industry or the
Cuban owned banks and the "retaliatory" language of Cuban Law No.
851, in a society which was undergoing a revolutionary economic transfor-
mation as a justification for a total economic blockade of a dependent
economy such as Cuba's.
See Seers, supra note 55, at 6-19.
See generally Nolff, supra note 76, at 286-95.
See Appendix D.
1 See Appendix A.
125 See Appendix B.
"0 See Appendix E.
117 See Appendix E.
Is See generally Seers, supra note 55; Nolff, supra note 76, at 321-25.
129 See Nolff, supra note 76, at 321-25.
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Historical documents indicate that the Cubans had not closed the
door to negotiations. In a note dated June 15, 1959, replying to a U.S.
protest against the Agrarian Reform Law, the Cuban government offered
to discuss terms of indemnification for U.S. owners of nationalized prop-
erty.80 On January 27, 1960, President Dorticos, in a public address, of-
fered to negotiate any and all differences between the United States and
Cuba. ' In a diplomatic note dated February 22, 1960, Foreign Minister
Roa offered to name a commission to discuss all disagreements between
the parties. 32 On July 18, 1960, the head of the Cuban Mission to the
United Nations advised the Security Council of the United Nations that
Cuba was prepared to settle all differences with the government of the
United States. 3 3 On September 26, 1960, Prime Minister Castro, at a
meeting of the General Assembly, offered to discuss openly all problems
relating to the relationship between the United States and Cuba. 3"
In addition, on October 10, 1061, Foreign Minister Roa, speaking at
the General Assembly of the United Nations, offered to negotiate with
the United States, suggesting "an open agenda" for such a meeting. 3 5 In
January 1962, President Dorticos, at the Punta Del Este Conference,
stated that Cuba was willing to consider indemnification of U.S. citizens
who suffered losses. 3 6 On October 8, 1962, President Dorticos, speaking
at the General Assembly meeting, again offered to negotiate all
differences.'
Even assuming that Cuba had been delinquent in its expropriations,
the United States government's conduct in instituting the blockade of
trade both in terms of its proportion to the Cuban wrong being chal-
lenged and the manner of its imposition prior to exhausting all channels
of negotiation and compromise contravened the traditional standards of
international conduct articulated by the U.S. State Department. The fail-
ure of the United States to act in accordance with traditional views of
international law, is not an easy case to explore. The relations between
the United States and Cuba have been extremely tense and have included
attempts to subvert the Cuban government by the use of violent force. 38
Commentaries, scholarly tracts and court decisions have all been tainted
by the ideological orientation and distinctive economic systems to which
1SO Verified by author.
"' See 14 U.N. SCOR (874th mtg.) 25, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 874 (1960).
132 See id. at 25-26.
"" Id. at 27.
.34 15 U.N. GAOR (872d plen. mtg.) 113, 117, U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 872 (1960).
'" 16 U.N. GAOR (1032d plen. mtg.) 355, 365 U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 1032 (1961).
136 Verified by author.
.37 17 U.N. GAOR (1145th plen. mtg.) 369, U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 1145 (1962).138 See ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No. 94-465,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-179 (1975).
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the two nations subscribe. The impropriety of U.S. conduct under a con-
temporary view of international law is much clearer. The following dis-
cussion begins with a definition of the current contemporary standards of
conduct between nations regarding economic coercion. It then analyzes
the actions of the United States according to such standards.
V. PERSPECTIVE UNDER CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
In passing the Export Administration Act of 196939 Congress de-
clared it to be U.S. policy: "To use [U.S.] economic resources and trade
potential to further. . . [U.S.] national security and foreign policy objec-
tives. 14 0 The developing nations were well aware of the potentially devas-
tating effects of the manipulation of economic power in furthering such
policies could have on their own weaker economics where their national
goals conflicted with western interests. These nations have sought recog-
nition of the principle that economic coercion constitutes an illicit use of
power in international relations. To achieve this aim they have turned,
inter alia, to the General Assembly of the United Nations. 14 1 The United
Nations has exploded in size in the past 25 years and has become,
through its one nation one vote system, the international voice of the de-
veloping countries.1 4 2 Two avenues of approach have been taken in this
effort: the prohibition of the use of economic power by inserting it into
the concept of non-intervention and 14 1 two, the attempt to extend the
definition of force contained in Article 2 (4) of the U.N. charter to include
the idea of economic aggression.1 4 4 The former has been largely success-
ful, while the latter has yet to attain a consensus in the face of western
power opposition.
131 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1976).
140 Id. at § 2402(4).
"4 The Conferences of Non-Aligned Nations have served as fora for the developing
countries' position that economic coercion is an illicit use of power. The Economic Declara-
tion of the Algiers Conference of Non-Aligned Countries supports the principle that nation-
alization is an expression of state sovereignty and national legislation controls the amount
and mode of compensation. Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-
Aligned Countries (Algiers, Sept. 5-9, 1973), Economic Declaration, partially reprinted in,
Haight, The New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAW, 591, 591 (1975). It is in the General Assembly, however, that
the strength of opposing views can be measured accurately.
142 See Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Re-
flection or Rejection of International Law? 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 296 (1975).
"' E.g., Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
144 See Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International
Law, [1972-I] RECUEIL DES CoURs 411, 449-52; Bowett, International Law and Economic
Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245, 245-46 (1976).
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Since the Third World nations have so skillfully used the General
Assembly to speak for them, there has been growing debate concerning
the juridically binding nature of General Assembly resolutions and decla-
rations. 45 The developing and socialist countries, while not always in
complete agreement, would consider most General Assembly resolutions
to be a progressive development and codifications of new rules of law,
more reflective of post-mid-century socioeconomic and political reality.'"
The Western powers and Japan, as led by the United States, refuse to
acknowledge any binding force in General Assembly declarations." 7 They
point to the fact that at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, a Phillip-
pine proposal to make the General Assembly an international legislative
body was overwhelmingly defeated. 48 Further, they argue that resolu-
tions of the General Assembly and other international bodies are not
mentioned as sources of International Court of Justice."" Finally, they
argue that the new principles are not considered international law be-
cause they do not reflect customary long-term usage and practice of
States. 50
The fact that the United States in particular should insist that no
new international law has emerged is not surprising in view of the follow-
ing observation:
The United States remains, however, without doubt the master of the
boycott, including all forms of trade controls and economic coercion. We
developed great expertise during World War II .... (W)e have used
these techniques in peacetime to influence domestic actions in other
countries. The problems of the Hickenlooper, the Gonzales and the Jack-
son-Vanik amendments are akin to boycott issues; all are forms of ex-
traterritorial economic coercion.' 5'
In contrast, the spokesmen for the new standard argue that the
changing world situation has caused changes in the activities of the
United Nations and that, in spite of the limited role originally envisioned
for the General Assembly, it has gradually become a quasi-legislative
1' J. CASTAREDA, LEGAL EFFECTS Os U.N. RESOLUTIONS (1966); Falk, On the Quasi-Leg-
islative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966).
M The developing countries are the prime movers in the "trend from consent to con-
sensus" in regard to international legal obligations. Falk, supra note 145, at 784-85. See
also, Shihata, Arab Oil Policies and the New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L
L. 261, 261 n.2 (1976).
147 See, e.g., Haight, supra note 141, at 597; see also, White, A New International Eco-
nomic Order?, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 330 (1976).
148 See Falk, supra note 145, at 783.
:49 See I.C.J. STAT. art. 38.
50 See, e.g., White, supra note 147, at 330.
1 Maw, Historical Aspects of U.S. Involvement in Boycotts, [19771 PROC. AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. 170, 171-72.
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body that has profoundly affected international law.15 2 As early as 1948
one writer considered General Assembly resolutions to have a moral force
that "is in fact a nascent legal force which may enjoy . . . a twilight exis-
tence hardly distinguishable from morality and justice until the time
when the imprimatur of the world community will attest to its jural
quality. "5
3
Some General Assembly pronouncements are recognized as law in
certain opinions of the International Court of Justice itself. 5" The argu-
ment that resolutions do not have the requisite customary usage to be-
come incorporated in the corpus of international law is self-defeating be-
cause it implicitly recognizes the validity of the developing countries'
contention that since they were not an independent part of the world of
nations their concerns and reality are in no way reflected in what the
Western World considers international law. As the Third World imple-
ments the principles espoused -in U.N. resolutions these new principles
will inevitably become new legal norms. Furthermore, to the extent that a
majority of nations indicate their rejection of traditional international
law, the traditional rule can be said to lack the element of opinio juris.'55
Most commentators in developed countries, in spite of vociferous de-
nials of the existence of a new progressive international law, simultane-
ously concede that General Assembly declarations do represent a consen-
sus among the great majority of nations and constitute, therefore, a
political and moral force that must be taken into account. " Significantly,
in the wake of the Arab destination embargo on oil shipments, several
Western commentators readily adopted the positions espoused by the
Third World to denounce "economic coercion" and find the embargo ille-
gal under international law. 157 Thus, as Third World countries collectively
assert economic interests, the standards they suggest as new legal norms
152 See J. CASTAREDA, supra note 145; Castaheda, The Underdeveloped Nations and
the Development of International Law, 15 INT'L ORG. 38 (1961).
" Sloane, The Binding Force of a "Recommendation" of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, [1948] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
154 See Schwebel, The Effect of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary Interna-
tional Law, [1979] PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 301, 303.
J. CASTAREDA, supra note 145, at 171.
'8 Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972);
Bowett, supra note 144; Lillich, Economic Coercion and the New International Economic
Order: A Second Look at Some First Impressions, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 233 (1976); Rozental,
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New International Eco-
nomic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309 (1976); White, supra note 147.
15 Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile: Eco-
nomic and Political Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 3, 11-16 (1974); Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon: A Threat to Interna-
tional Peace, 68 Am. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974).
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will also be useful to the developed nations in protecting their interests.'"8
Therefore, Western commentators have conceded the principle that some
forms of economic coercion may be illegal, even while they deny the exis-
tence of a new standard in international law.
A. The Principle of Non-Intervention
While the concept of economic aggression has yet to be defined
clearly, there are numerous U.N. resolutions which indicate that the ma-
jority of nations consider the use of economic coercion illegal. The Gen-
eral Assembly declaration on non-intervention adopted in 1965, provides:
"No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from
it advantages of any kind."' 5
This language was repeated verbatim in the resolution on principles
of international law concerning friendly relations'6" which is treated as
being an authoritative interpretation of the Charter and declaratory of
contemporary international law. 1 '1
Further support is found in the resolution on sovereignty over natu-
ral resources adopted in 1973 which ". . . (d)eplores acts of State which
involve force, armed aggression, economic coercion or other illegal or im-
proper means of resolving disputes. . . [and emphasizes] the duty of all
States to refrain in their international relations from military, political,
economic or any other form of coercion.. ."I" The developing countries
intended the prohibition to impose a binding obligation on all nations, as
indicated in the debates leading to the adoption of the Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States1 8 in 1974 in conjunction with the Dec-
'58 Brower & Tepe, supra note 142. Brower and Tepe warn the developing countries
that there is insufficient similarity of economic interests for the developed countries to ac-
cept the Third World view of international law, and since the developing nations need
Western technology they had better adopt the status quo view of international law. Id. at
317-18.
1"9 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, supra note 143.
160 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
'' Bowett, supra note 144, at 245; Lillich, supra note 156, at 236.
"' Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 28
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, 53, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
"" G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). The
Charter was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 120 in favor, 6 opposed (Belgium,
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, and the United
States), and 10 abstentions (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Spain). See 14 INT'L L. MATERIALs 251, 265 (1975) (reprinting the
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laration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. '64
The idea for the formation of the 1974 Charter was launched by Presi-
dent Luis Echeverria of Mexico in 1972. In his address to the 92nd Ple-
nary Meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment he suggested that the international economy be placed on a "firm
legal footing".1 5 Among the principles proposed to be incorporated in the
new Charter were the right of every nation to adopt the economic situa-
tion it considered most suitable for its needs and the condemnation of the
use of economic pressures from other nations."6 ' At the opening sessions
of the working group charged with drafting the Charter the chairman,
Ambassador Jorge Castaneda of Mexico, stated that the purpose of the
group was to "enunciate authentic economic rights and duties of States in
the only way which it is logically possible to do so: as rights and duties of
a juridical nature intended to be binding" and "to formulate legal, and
therefore obligatory rights and duties. 167 He particularly stressed that
the group would be formulating new rules which would respond to the
present and future needs of the world community since "merely to codify
existing international economic law would be tantamount to defending
the maintenance of the status quo which has certainly not promoted the
welfare of two-thirds of mankind." '
The Western powers immediately objected to any attempt to propose
binding rules of law and the language in the drafts,"9 which would have
made the binding intention explicit, was modified. Nevertheless, it is still
recognized that "the strategy behind the Charter came to be a desire to
develop. . . a statement of principles which, even if not binding, could be
construed by those States which reject traditional international law as a
statement of international law"' 70
Subsequently, in 1975, at the Second General Conference of UNIDO,
at Lima, Peru, a declaration was adopted by a vote of 82-1-7 which ex-
pressed the "need for the international community to comply in full with
the precepts contained in the Charter" and urged that it be accepted as
roll call vote).
'64 G.A. Res. 3201, (S-VI), Sixth Special Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9559 (1974).
"" Summary of Address by Luis Echeverria, 1A UNCTAD Proceedings, Third Session,
184, 186, U.N. Doc. TD/180 (1972).
186 Id.
167 Statement by the Chairman of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/R.4 at 2
(1973).
168 Id.
" For several views on the events preceeding the adoption of the Charter see Rozental,
supra note 156; Brower & Tepe, supra note 142; Note, Charter on Economic Rights and
Duties of States: A Solution to the Development Aid Problem?, 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
441, 450-57 (1974).
170 Brower & Tepe, supra note 142, at 302.
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having binding legal effect on the conduct of international economic
relations.1 7
1
Article 32 of the 1974 Charter provides: "No State may use or en-
courage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to
coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of its
sovereign rights. 1 72 In Article 2, it clearly indicates that the question of
the nationalization of foreign corporations and the determination of com-
pensation to be paid were facets of a State's full permanent sovereignty
over "all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities".7 Specifi-
cally, Article 2(2)(c) provides that a State has a right to nationalize prop-
erty, "in which case appropriate compensation should be paid" according
to the laws of the State taking the action.1 7 4 In the words of Ambassador
Castaneda:
(I)t should be internal legal order which establishes the procedures and
means of compensation. What is not to be tolerated, and what the over-
whelming majority of countries have therefore completely rejected, is
that instead of or in addition to the national legal system, other bodies or
extra-national procedures should be called on to rule on what a State
should do in such cases. To accept such a system as binding would be to
place States on an equal legal and political footing with foreign corpora-
tions, and that would mean that those corporations would receive noth-
ing more or less than the treatment which should be reserved solely for
States.
17 5
The Economic Charter then, in spite of U.S. and Western power op-
position, can be considered as a clear rejection of the protection accorded
private foreign investment by traditional international law by a majority
of the member States.
17, Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Co-operation,
U.N. Doc. ID/B/155/add.1, at 22 (1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L L. MATERiALS 826, 844 (1975).
172 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 163, at art. 32.
171 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 163, at art 2; see also paragraph 4 of the Declaration of a
New International Economic Order which states:
[e]ach State is entitled to exercise effective control over (its natural resources and
economic activities) with means suitable to its own situation, including the right
to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an
expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be sub-
jected to economic political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and
full exercise of this inalienable right.
G.A. Res. 3201, supra note 164, at para. 4.
'7' G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 163, at art. 2(2)(c).
.76 29 U.N. GAOR (2315 plen. mtg.) U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 2315 (1974).
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B. Economic Aggression Prohibited by the U.N. Charter and Interna-
tional Agreements
Many countries argue that the proscription on the use of force con-
tained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter extends to the concept of eco-
nomic aggression. M However, with the adoption of a limited definition of
aggression by the General Assembly in 1974, it is apparent that propo-
nents of this view have not yet been able to gain a concensus. 1 7 Debate
on this issue is far from stilled, however, many countries view the adopted
definition as only a first step toward an extended definition. 178
In addition to the Charter, it has been suggested that international
treaty agreements serve as a legal basis for prohibiting economic aggres-
sion.'M Thus, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties8" contains a
provision specifically condemning
the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, political or
economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to perform any
act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of
the sovereign equality of States and freedom of consent . .. ",8
More importantly, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)18 2 contains a general prohibition on the use of export and import
controls in Article 11188 and the implementation of these controls through
incorporation of the most-favored-nation requirement of non-discrimina-
tion in the clause in Article 1. '' In addition, Article 23 provides for the
authorization of retaliatory action by the contracting parties thereby im-
plicitly precluding such action.1a
For an analysis of whether article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter should be read restric-
tively or expansively see Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality
Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 993-1008
(1974).
177 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (!974).
78 See Note, Defining Economic Aggression in International Law: The Possibility of
Regional Action by the Organization of American States, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 85 (1978).
179 See Bowett, supra note 144, at 247-48; Muir, supra note 33, at 200-02; Note, supra
note 178, at 89.
80 Opened for signature, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39-27, reprinted in 8 INT'L
L. MATERIALS 679 (1969).
1981 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 39/26 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L L. MATERIALS 728, 733 (1969). See Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, supra note 180, at art. 52; Boorman, supra note 45, at 215-16;
Muir, supra note 33, at 199.
181 Done at Geneva, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 266.
183 Id. at art 11.
'84 Id. at art 1.
... Id. at art 23; see Bowett, supra note 144, at 247-48 (discussing GATT as a means to
combat economic coercion).
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Both Cuba and the United States are signatories to the GATT."s6
The United States never requested authorization for its economic block-
ade against Cuba, nor did it invoke the security exception contained in
GATT provisions. Thus, it may be possible that the U.S. action was taken
in violation of GATT. Further research is needed to substantiate this
point.
C. The Parameters of Illegal Economic Coercion
While the U.N. resolutions clearly indicate that the majority of na-
tions consider economic coercion illegal, the exact parameters of what
constitutes illegal coercion have not been defined. Commentators have
proposed that the vagueness of present formulations may be reduced by
applying a test of unlawful intent.187 Perhaps those economic measures
undertaken primarily "for the purpose of damaging the economy of an-
other nation or as a means of coercing another nation should be acts of
unlawful intervention".188
Second, the act must be of sufficient intensity to have seriously dis-
rupted the victim country's economy. Some authors distinguish between
the degree of disruption necessary for determining illegality. Others view
any economic intervention that causes some disruption and hence could
be considered illegal, to be "aggravated illegality of such proportions as to
constitute aggression".189 Under the former view, no economic coercion
could be considered illegal unless it was of severe intensity. The latter
view, however, implicitly recognizes the illegality of most interventionist
measures, but would only consider intense disruption "aggressive".
Finally, others propose that the aggressive or coercive act need not
necessarily be economic in nature. As long as its purpose and result was
economic disruption, the act could be condemned as constituting eco-
nomic aggression.1 °
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever view is adopted, either that of coercion or aggression, it is
quite evident that the imposition of the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba
constituted an illegal act. Under the contemporary standard, illegality did
not occur until the United States reduced the sugar quota in 1960. The
United States attempted to justify its modification of the Sugar Act on
186 GATT, supra note 182, at A7.
'78 Bowett, supra note 156, at 5; Note, supra note 178, at 96-100; Muir, supra note 33,
at 203-04.
188 Note, supra note 178, at 96-97.
189 See Note, supra note 178, at 96-97 and authorities cited therein.
0 Note, supra note 178, at 96-97.
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the grounds that Cuba would no longer be a reliable trading partner be-
cause of shifts it intended to effectuate in diversifying its economy and
changing its economic structure. 91 However, at least one North American
court has recognized that the legislative history evidences an intent to
retaliate against an "unfriendly county". 192
At the time of the reduction in the sugar quota, the only "un-
friendly" acts committed by Cuba toward the United States was the na-
tionalization of large Cuban land holdings and some U.S. controlled com-
panies.198 Under the new standard of international law as outlined in the
Economic Charter, this activity is specifically a right reserved to the sov-
ereign power of the States.1 94 On the other hand, it is well recognized that
Cuba was a one-crop economy, totally dependent on the U.S. economy. 95
Sudden reduction of the U.S. sugar quota was a measure designed to dis-
locate the entire Cuban economy."6
Faced with what it characterized as and what contemporary interna-
tional law would consider "economic aggression," the Cubans proceeded
to nationalize the large sugar concerns. Even though the action was in
part a retaliatory response to U.S. action, it was primarily the nationali-
zation pursued in accordance with the ultimate goal of Cuba to change its
own economic structure."7 The defensive aspects of the action have been
justified in the abstract by commentators."' The legality of a change of
economic structure is unquestionable.
After these initial acts, the escalation of the U.S. economic blockade
can surely be consideed economic aggression. The 1962 Senate resolution
specifically relates the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba to preventing the
extension of Communist influence in the Western hemisphere, and to fur-
thering self-determination by the Cuban people."' In other words, the
Cuban economic structure was deemed unacceptable to the U.S. govern-
ment. A clearer statement of illegitimate purpose would be difficult to
make.
Further, the United States, as the strongest economic power, was in a
position to attempt to eliminate the Cuban State through its use of eco-
nomic power. Thus, OAS approval of U.S. action was sought and obtained
and in turn used to justify the original U.S. action. 00 However, justifying
"' 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 140 (1960).
102 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 865.
"93 See notes 61-67 supra and accompanying text.
"9' G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 163, at art. 2(2)(c).
'95 See notes 121-124 supra and accompanying text.
'" See notes 121-129 supra and accompanying text.
.17 See Seers, supra note 55.
"I Note, supra note 178, Muir, supra note 33.
'99 S.J. Res. 230, Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
200 See Claude, The OAS, the United Nations, and the United States, 547 INT'L CON-
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the action is frivolous because the U.S. action antedated OAS action and
OAS sanctions have since been removed.20 1
In spite of the reluctance of U.S. authorities to accept the new stan-
dards in international law, the fact that U.S. commentators have begun to
limit the parameters of illegal economic coercion indicates that the con-
temporary view is gradually gaining recognition if not acceptance. If there
still remains doubt as to the illegality of the economic blockade under the
traditional view, there is no doubt that the blockade is a fragrant viola-
tion of the contemporary standard which is founded on economic princi-
ples and sovereign equality between states.
CILIATION 1, 34-43, 53-60 (1964) (discussing the interaction between the United Nations and
the OAS over the Cuban situation); DuBois, supra note 11.
201 Journal of Commerce, July 31, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
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APPENDIX A
CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTIONS AND EXPORT
(In Thousands of Metric Tons)
PERCENT OF
YEAR PRODUCTION TOTAL EXPORT TO U.S. EXPORT
5,784
5,964
5,862
6,767
4,815
3,821
4,589
6,082
4,867
6,236
5,315
5,534
7,559
5,950
4,688
5,383
5,926
6,427
6,151
4,226
4,644
5,394
5,307
5,632
4,952
5,635
.6,414
5,131
3,521
4,176
5,316
4,435
5,683
4,613
4,799
6,906
5,511
4,140
4,797
5,491
5,744
5,764
5,683
4,613
2,519
2,663
2,881
2,883
3,241
2,937
1,949
SOURCES: INTERNATIONAL SUGAR COUNCIL, SUGAR YEARBOOK (volumes for 1958-1976);
COMMODITY RESEARCH BUREAU, [1978] COMMODITY YEARBOOK, 329.
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES SUGAR PRODUCTION, IMPORTS & CONSUMPTIONS
(In Thousands of Metric Tons)
CUBAN PERCENT OF
YEAR PRODUCTION IMPORTS ORIGIN IMPORTS CONSUMPTION
4,109
4,334
4,576
4,887
4,913
5,340
5,965
5,691
5,989
5,539
5,690
5,409
5,734
5,570
5,724
5,729
5,399
5,955
6,438
3,510
3,669
3,902
3,914
4,374
4,188
4,637
3,988
4,248
4,168
3,295
3,653
4,077
4,357
4,655
4,432
4,804
5,069
4,952
4,835
5,250
3,515
4,228
4,252
4,654
2,519
2,663
2,881
2,883
3,241
2,937
1,949
8,400
8,542
8,600
8,936
9,075
9,235
8,951
9,353
9,624
9,685
10,218
9,947
10,548
10,530
10,619
10,630
10,325
9,142
9,999
SOURCES: INTERNATIONAL SUGAR COUNCIL, SUGAR YEARBOOK (volumes for 1958-1976);
COMMODITY RESEARCH BUREAU, [1978] COMMODITY YEARBOOK 329.
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APPENDIX C
WORLD SUGAR PRICES
(In U.S. cents per pound)
SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL SUGAR
1976).
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
COUNCIL,
4.98
5.70
4.17
3.41
3.26
3.24
3.47
5.16
3.50
2.97
3.14
2.70
2.78
8.29
5.72
2.03
1.76
1.87
1.85
3.20
3.68
4.50
7.27
9.45
29.66
20.37
11.51
SUGAR YEARBOOK (volumes for 1964, 1968,
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APPENDIX D
CUBA-IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
(In Millions of Cuban Pesos)
TOTAL FROM TOTAL TO
YEAR IMPORTS U.S. PERCENT EXPORTS U.S. PERCENT
1950 515.4 407.55 79 642.0 381.23 59
1951 640.2 493.23 77 766.1 417.72 54
1952 618.1 462.73 74 675.3 408.89 60
1953 489.7 370.93 75 640.3 393.00 61
1954 487.9 367.32 75 539.0 368.96 68
1955 575.1 423.25 73 594.2 401.26 67
1956 649.0 487.70 75 666.2 430.84 64
1957 772.8 578.36 74 807.7 467.57 57
1958 777.0 506.6 65 733.5 490.7 66
1959 673.5 458.67 68 637.4 445.3 69
1960 637.9 309.7 48 617.3 328.93 53
1961 702.6 26.1 4 625.9 30.25 4
1962 759.3 0.64 .08 520.6 4.17 .7
1963 867.3 543.8 00
SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STETISTICS (volumes for
1952-1965).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES-IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
TOTAL FROM TOTAL TO
YEAR IMPORTS CUBA PERCENT EXPORTS CUBA PERCENT
1950 8,853 404 4 10,149 454 4
1951 10,921 416 4 14,888 537 3.5
1952 10,815 433 4 15,054 514 3.5
1953 10,874 434 4 15,660 425 3.5
1954 10,319 400 4 14,981 428 3
1955 11,410 417 3.5 15,430 450 3
1956 12,645 458 3.5 18,947 518 3
1957 13,109 478 3.5 20,682 617 3
1958 12,914 518 4 17,697 543 3
1959 15,476 467 3 17,459 437 3
1960 15,071 342 3 20,383 222 1
1961 14,702 35 20,755 14
1962 16,326 16 21,418 13
1963 17,076 7 23,102 36
SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS (volumes for
1952-1965).
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